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NOTES
AIRPORT-NUISANCE-TRESPASS-MAXIM-RIGHTS

OF NEIGHBORING LAND-

OWNERS.-[C. C. A. 6th] The United States Circuit of Appeals (6th circuit)
recently modified the decree of the District Court in the case of Swetland
v. Curtiss Airports Corp.' to include the entire operation of defendant's
airport within the scope of the injunction. This is the first decision in the
country banning the "normal" operations of an airport as a nuisance. The
broad injunction against the operation of the airport is based upon the
finding that the evidence in the case showed that the defendant's airport
and flying school, although lawful in themselves, constituted a nuisance to
the plaintiffs who resided in a country estate adjoining the airport. The
court stated that it refused to hold that every flight of an airplane was a
trespass to the landowner over whose property the flight was made, and that
the present flying over the plaintiffs' property had not been within the "zone"
where the plaintiffs had a right of action other than to abate a nuisance.
The court considered the noise, dust, night flying, traffic congestion, the
danger from low-flying aircraft, especially student flying, the impairment
to the value of plaintiffs' property, the availability of other sites for defendants' airport and the financial loss to the defendant from closing the
airport. The court concluded from the evidence that the normal operations
of the "AlA" airport which the defendants were developing would "unavoidably interfere with, if not destroy, the plaintiffs' enjoyment of their
property." Judge Hickenlooper, in a concurring opinion, dissented from
that portion of the court's opinion, written by Judge Moorman, which set
2
forth the rights of the landowner against flights in the lower stratum.
Aviation affects the rights of landowners in three essentially different
respects: (1) Nuisance from an airport directly. (2) Trespass-nuisance
from flying over private property, in taking off and landing incident to the
operation of an airport. (3) Trespass-nuisance from- cross-country flying
over private property, independent of airport operations, for example, repeated flying on an established airway over the landowner's property. The
court in the instant case was presented with only the first two problems
by the plaintiffs' prayer for an injunction against the operation of the airport. The first problem was merely the application of established rules of
nuisance to a new industry and will be dealt with first in a summary manner, after the facts of the instant case have been set forth. The second
raises problems peculiar to aviation and the court's treatment will subsequently be discussed and suggestions made. The third problem was not
involved in the instant litigation and will not be treated in this note.
The Swetlands owned a hundred and thirty-five acre tract of land on
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the west side of Richmond Road in the village of Richmond Heights, eleven
miles by direct line from the city of Cleveland. Improvements to the property approximated $115,000 and consisted chiefly of two residences, in one
plaintiffs had resided for over twenty-five years. On May 28, 1929, or
shortly before, the defendant corporations purchased 272 acres on the east
side of Richmond Road immediately opposite the plaintiffs' residences for
$398,048 for the purpose of establishing an extensive airport and flying
school to serve the eastern side of the Cleveland metropolitan area. The
defendants acquired a second tract in the vicinity at about the same time
and were offered a third site. Both of these tracts were apparently well
suited for an airport but would involve greater expense to improve than the
one opposite the plaintiffs' property. The plaintiffs informed the air companies immediately that the proposed airport would "destroy" their property
for residential purposes. On being advised that the defendants intended to
proceed with the establishment of an airport, the present suit in equity
was filed on June 1, 1929, three days after defendants purchased, to enjoin
the use of defendants' property as an airport. The defendants contemplated
an extensive flying school, public lights for night operations, and public
exhibitions with extensive accommodation for crowds and automobiles. The
"all way" landing field and hangars were to be located on the portion of
defendants' property adjacent to the plaintiffs'. The nearest point of the
landing field would be within 800 feet of the plaintiffs' residences, and the
hangars and fairways from 900 to 1500 feet. The remote section of the
tract is wooded and the defendants intended to develop that portion into a
golf course and subdivision.3 The testimony was conflicting as to the ex4
tent and height of defendants' flying above plaintiffs' property. The district
court enjoined (1) permitting dust to drift over plaintiff's property in substantial and annoying quantities, (2) dropping of circulars over plaintiffs'
land, and (3) permitting airplanes under their control to fly over plaintiffs'
property at an altitude of less than 500 feet. The plaintiffs appealed from
the lower court's refusal to enjoin (1) the use of defendants' property as
an airport and flying school, and (2) from the refusal to enjoin flying over
their property above 500 feet. The defendants appealed only from the
5
injunction against flying over plaintiffs' property below 500 feet in altitude.
In dealing with the problem of a nuisance from an airport directly, the
Circuit Court of Appeals enunciated the general formula that:
3. "W. R. Crawford, Jr., Vice President of Curtiss Airports, testified that:
'The easterly portion of the premises where there are now trees, the trees will

be removed back almost to the road. which will be developed as a private residential and country club site, where there is now a small creek. and the
natural beauty of the eastern part of the premises will not be affected, but
it will be developed in conjunction with the rest of the airport for providing a
residential and private flying club site.' There was some talk at the very
commencement of the enterprise of developing the eastern part as a country
club and golf club, and property owners in the vicinity wrote a letter to Curtiss
Flying Service, Inc., 'expressing our belief that we consider the development
of your property into a high-class airport and country club will enhance the
value of our respective properties . . . ."-Excerpt from letter to the writer
from Charles P. Hine of the firm of Thompson, Htne and Flory, attorneys for
the plaintiffs. See also page 29 of appellants' brief.
4. See infra, and appellant's brief, page 23.
5. The plaintiffs contended that "the flying of aeroplanes at any distance
above their property is a trespass which in the nature of the operation of the

air field must constantly recur, and which a court of equity should accordingly
enjoin." The defendant asserted that the "plaintiffs do not own the air space
above their property and have no right to prevent its use at will for flying
purposes short of the creation of a nuisance."
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"The defendants have the right to establish airports, but they cannot
lawfully establish one at a place where its normal operation will deprive
plaintiffs of the use and enjoyment of their property."
The court found that the facts of the instant case fell within this formula,
and indicated that numerous factors had been taken into consideration in holding the defendants' airport a nuisance: (1) The lights and noises incident
to night operations would be particularly annoying to the plaintiffs. (2) The
plaintiffs' property had already depreciated $65,000. (3) The plaintiffs were
old residents of the community, desirous of continuing to live there, and
would be "put to the inconvenience of leaving their property and seeking
other playes to live." The resulting "severance of their social relations"
would cause injury "that cannot be measured in damages," thereby making
the remedy at law inadequate. (4) By promptly notifying the defendants
that the contemplated airport would be a nuisance, the plaintiffs were guilty
of no laches. (5) The value of defendants' property was not so out of
proportion to that of the plaintiff's as to make abatement inequitable. Plaintiffs' property was valued at $165,000 as compared with defendants' investment
of not over $398,048, and probably only $270,000, at the time of plaintiffs'
notice. When the plaintiffs gave notice that the airport would be objectionable, the defendants' expenditure consisted solely of the price paid for the land
which presumably was "now worth what defendants paid for it." (6) The
defendants' Richmond Road "site was not indispensable to the public interest"
as an airport because defendants had and could have acquired other sites
equally accessible to Cleveland. (7) Low flying over plaintiffs' property would
take place in taking off or landing "up-wind" when the wind was from the east
or west (not the prevailing wind). The court notes that the flying of
students, who, during their period of instruction of about 20 hours, average
"20 take-offs and landings per hour," would be especially offensive. Property rights are involved in this last type of annoyance and will be considered
below.
The court enjoined the airport only "as now located" and referred the
case to the lower court, because of lack of evidence in the record, to determine whether "other parts of the property could be used without seriously interfering with the plaintiffs' enjoyment." This reference apparently
refers to relocating the airport proper on the portion of the tract, above
referred to, which the defendant intended to utilize as a golf course or a
subdivision.
The decision of the District Court indicates that Judge Hahn either
did not believe that the above elements existed in the instant case to the
8
same degree or else did not give the same credence to them. While the
instant court took into consideration many factors in deciding that the
defendants' airport was a nuisance, it is to be noted that there was no evidence that defendants' operations were peculiar or more annoying than
would be found from the operation of any large metropolitan airport. The
Circuit Court of Appeals does not use the term "nuisance per se," and its
holding clearly indicates that it would not hold every airport a nuisance but
that such a holding would depend entirely upon the facts of the particular
case. Nevertheless the fact that defendants' airport is not peculiarly dis6.

Their opposing views clearly indicate how such cases depend entirely

upon the facts found by the judge:
26 I1. L. Rev. 645 and 761 (1932).

See Frank, "What Courts Do In Fact,"
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tinguishable from other large airports may involve important consequences
in regard to the future development of airports.
In dealing with the trespass-nuisance problem from flying over private
property in taking off and landing incident to the operation of an airport,
the court first considers the maxim cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum.
The court made the inevitable observation that the maxim had only been
"used in connection with occurrences common to the era, such as overhanging branches or eaves."r With this premise, the court concluded that
the maxim could not be used "to define the rights of the new and rapidly
growing business of aviation," consistently "with the traditional policy of
the courts to adapt the law to the economic and social needs of the times."
Having thus bluntly declared itself free from all precedent the court
proceeded to determine the plaintiffs' rights "in relation to the necessities of
the period." This daring approach would seem a desirable method of
handling a problem which involves new and far reaching economic considerations. The compromise suggested by the court was premised upon the
assertion that: "From that point of view we cannot hold that in every
case it is-a trespass against the owner of the soil to fly an aeroplane through
the airspace overlying the surface." This was a direct denial of the literal
interpretation of the maxim. 8 An understanding of the nature of the rights
that the court asserted were possessed by the landowner can best be grasped
from Judge Moorman's exact words. Having explained that certain flights
did not constitute a trespass, the court went on to explain:
"This does not mean that the owner of the surface has no rights at all
in the airspace above his land. He has a dominant right of occupancy for
purposes incident to his use and and enjoyment of the surface, and there
may be such a continuous and permanent use of the lower stratum which
he may reasonably expect to use or occupy himself as to impose a servitude
upon his use and enjoyment of the surface. See Portsmouth Co. v. United
States, 260 U. S. 327. As to the upper stratum which he may not reasonably expect to occupy, he has no right, it seems to us, except to prevent
the use of it by others to the extent of an unreasonable interference with
his complete enjoyment of the surface. His remedy for this latter use, we
think, is an action for nuisance and not trespass. We cannot fix a definite
and unvarying height below which the surface owner may reasonably expect to occupy the air space for himself. That height is to be determined
upon the particular facts of each case. It is sufficient for this case that the
7. The court recognized that the maxim had been frequently repeated "in
the law reports of every state" and was imbedded in our law before the
advent of aviation to the full extent that the nature of the maxim permitted.
The early English cases applying the maxim were denied to have been
"decided upon the theory of nuisance and not trespass." The ambiguity of the
term "ad coelum" was recognized-the term referred in the Latin to the
space a little above the tree tops. See Bouvd, "Private Ownership of Airspace,"
1 Air L. Rev. 232 and 376 (1930).
8. The validity of the old maxim Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum
was apparently recently asserted in a, statement by Lord Dunedin, member of the
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. A controversy had arisen over the
right to project advertisements on the sky over other landowners' property by
means of a search-light recently invented by Maj. J. C. Savage. Lord Dunedin
expressed the opinion that the airplane owner did not have the right to fly
over private property until the Air Navigation Act of 1920, Sec. 9, specifically
gave that right by providing-: "No action shall lie In respect of trespass or
in respect of nuisance by reason of the flight of aircraft over any property."
As a result, "Until it is similarly legalized, sky writing apparently remains
a form of aerial trespass in England and a property owner has as good a
right to protection on his sky as against a trespasser on his ground:"
New
York Times, Feb. 28, 1932.
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flying of the defendants over the plaintiffs' property was not within the
zone of such expected use."
The above language forms the crux of the court's assertion of the landowner's property rights in the airspace, and a careful examination of this
particular language may prove profitable. By asserting that the landowner has
a dominant right the court implied that there are other rights in the airspace and that such other rights are inferior to his rights. The landowner
has the right of occupancy. In one sense, every three-dimensional object
occupies conceptual space, whether the occupancy is temporary or permanent. Thus an airplane occupies airspace regardless of its altitude, just as
much as a building on the land. The court did not use the word permanent
to limit the landowner's occupancy, and would thus appear not to have
drawn a distinction between "permanent occupancy" and "temporary invasion incident to aerial navigation," as has frequently been done.9 The
court would seem to have recognized that airplanes occupy space by restricting the landowner's occupancy to purposes which are "incident to his use
and enjoyment of the surface." By the above limitation, the landowner's
superior rights do not extend to aerial navigation in the airspace above his
property unless incident to his use and enjoyment of the surface.
However, some flying may be incident to the use and enjoyment of the
surface. Thus taking off and landing from an airport is clearly incident to
the use of the surface. Flying instruction for students is likewise incident
to the airport from which the flying is conducted. More doubtful uses may
be enumerated: Anchorage of a dirigible by means of a cable without
the use of a fixed mooring mast, the use of a fixed balloon or blimp for
sight-seeing or advertising purposes by means of a cable for raising and
lowering, smaller balloons employed in a like manner to secure meteorological
information at great heights, the use of the airspace for the landowner's
own homing pigeons, and for attracting wild birds for hunting. The above
examples all involve moveable objects. In some of the instances the same
objects continuously and permanently occupy some portion of the landowner's space but not always the identical space as do buildings; in the
other instances the objects come and go but while in the airspace are more
or less incident to the use of the surface. The distinction between use and
enjoyment is obscure, but it would seem that essentially use refers to the
physical and enjoyment to the psychological, i. e., the subjective state of
mind with which the physical may be utilized. The above examples all
refer to instances more or less directly associated with the use of the surface. How much airspace is incident to the enjoyment of the surface can
only be found by applying the ordinary rules of nuisance to annoyances
created by the use of the airspace by persons other than the subjacent
owner. Of course the altitude at which each annoyance will come within
the ban of nuisance depends both upon the nature of the annoyance and
the use to which the surface and the space incident thereto are put.
The court proceeds to state: "And there may be such a continuous
and permanent use of the lower stratum which he may reasonably expect
to use or occupy himself as to impose a servitude upon his use and enjoyment of the surface." By this sentence it is believed the court intended to
9.
(1919).

Zollmann, Law of the Air (1927), p. 1;

comment, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 569
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indicate a qualification upon the landowner's rights and the manner by
which inferior rights might encroach upon the landowner's superior rights.
The word but and not and would seem to be the correct manner of introducing this qualification. The servitude mentioned apparently refers to one
acquired by an outsider to the detriment of the landowner's "use and
enjoyment of the surface." The pronouns should then be read: "But
there may be such a continuous and (or?) permanent use of the lower
stratum by some person other than the landowner which stratum he (the
landowner) may reasonably expect to use or occupy himself (the landowner) as to impose a servitude upon his (the landowner's) use and enjoyment of the surface."
The "continuous and permanent use" of the lower stratum appears to
refer to the use of that space by an aviator or some person other than the
landowner. Continuous and permanent would appear to refer only to fixed
or stationary uses of long duration, 10 and at the present time repeated
flights of airplanes or airships do not and cannot approach that character.
However the context as a whole indicates that the court intended to include flying in this category. Such use must be in the lower stratum which
is seemingly defined as that stratum which the landowner "may reasonably
expect to use or occupy himself." This stratum is not limited by the present
actual user of the surface, but extends to the reasonable potential user.
Modern science has taught, if nothing else, that men cannot predict what
use the next generation will make of the physical elements or airspace.
The court apparently recognized this by using the word reasonable which
orients the prediction of future users to that which men today conceive to
be within the realm of possibility. In the clause describing the lower stratum
the judge uses "use or occupy." The servitude is described as upon the
"use and enjoyment of the surface." The upper stratum is qualified as that
"which he may not reasonably expect to occupy." The clauses qualifying the
phrases upper and lower stratum do so in terms of the landowner's future
occupancy and/or enjoyment, but neither expressly limits such occupancy
to that which is incident to the surface. Possibly such limitation must be
implied but this is not certain.
The division of space into the upper and lower stratum is not an
"unvarying height," but depends upon "the particular facts of each case."
By distinguishing between the rights of the landowner in the upper and
lower strata of airspace, the court apparently adopted a "zone theory" of
the extent of the private ownership in airspace akin to that advanced by
the District Court by the phrase "effective possession."1 Thf Circuit
Court of Appeals asserted that "the flying of the defendants over the
plaintiffs' property was not within the zone of such expected use." It is
difficult to determine what the court considered the upper limit of the lower
stratum in the instant case. The court did not commit itself and it was
not necessary for the decision with the above conclusion. However, it
10. The court uses the word "and" to connect continuous and permanent.
The above comment is based upon the assumption that the court advisedly
used the word "and" in the sense of "plus." However it is believed that "or"
would be more correct. The use of "or" would be correct if the court intended
that servitudes might be acquired by continuous or repeated passages of an
airplane.
11. Ball, "Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land," 76 U. Pa. L. Rev. 631
(1928).
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would seem that the court considered the lower stratum to be limited to an
area relatively close to the surface in view of the following statement:
"Takeoffs and landings are required to be made 'up-wind,' and while the
prevailing wind is neither east nor west, when there is a wind from either
of these directions there will necessarily be much flying over plaintiff's
property, and often it will be at a much lower altitude than 500 feet. The
plaintiffs will undoubtedly suffer much annoyance from the noises made by
this low flying and the warming up, taking off and landing of aeroplanes
on the field."
The court limits the landowner's right of action in the upper stratum
to an action of nuisance, but does not expressly mention what actions if
any wi!l lit. in the lower stratum-trespass or nuisance. The landowner
apparently must take legal steps to prevent the acquisition of a servitude in
the lower stratum even though it does not impair his present use and
enjoyment of the surface. Where a servitude may be acquired, the owner
of the servient estate usually has the right to bring trespass against each
act that makes up the servitude. Here the right to prevent servitudes
would appear to be a burden upon the landowner rather than a benefit
unless coupled with the right to bring trespass against any invasion of the
lower stritum.
The desirability of choosing the term "servitude" to indicate the limitation upon the airspace rights of the landowner lies in the fact that it leaves
future courts the maximum freedom to interpret the term as the facts
subsequently presented demand. The term is of civil law origin and roughly
corresponds to the common law term "easement."' 1 2 Servitude is probably
the broader term in that it includes profits A prendre'3 It has been doubted
whether easements can be acquired by airplanes because of the impossibility
of repeating flights through exactly the same airspace. 14 Servitudes acquired by aerial navigation would apparently be "in gross" except where
incident to the operation of an airport. Thus the airport would be a "dominant estate" when the servitude was acquired by flights made by an airport operator incident to taking-off and landing therefrom. The distinction
between "in gross" and "appurtenant" is important for the reasons that an
easement in gross is usually regarded as a purely personal right which
cannot be transferred by the original holder.15 On the other hand, an easement appurtenant, a profit h prendre in gross, and a profit A prendre ap12. Blain v. Stabb, 10 N. M. 743, 65 Pac. 177 (1901) ; Corning v. Gould,
16 Wend. (N. Y.) 531, 538 (1837) ; Hieffer v Imhoif, 26 Pa. (2 Casey) 438
(1856) ; Washburn Real Property (6th ed., 1942), Sec. 1225; Washburn Easements and Servitudes (4th ed., 1885), Sec. 1, par. 4.
13. German Savings A Loan Society v. Gordon, 54 Ore. 147, 102 Pac. 736
(1909) ; Kieffer v. Imhoff, supra; Ballentine Law Dictionary, p. 189. On
servitudes in gross, see Smith v. Cooley, 65 dal. 46, 2 Pac. 880 (1884).
14. See Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., infra, at page 531, N. E. page
393; "Although there appear to have been a considerable number of trespasses
by aircraft, it seems plain that they are not in the same place as to linear
space or altitude. In the nature of things the flights of aircraft must vary
with wind and load. No prescriptive right to any particular way of passage
could be acquired in these conditions."
15. Louisville, etc. R. Co. v. Koelle, 104 Ill.455 (1882); Messenger v.
Ritz, 345 Ill.
433, 178 N. E. 38 (1931) ; Tinicum Fishing Co. v. Carter, 61 Pa.
21 (1869) ; Kershaw v. Burns, 91 S. C. 129, 74 S. E. 378 (1911) ; Salem Capital
Flour Mills v. Stayton Water Ditch & Canal Co. 33 Fed. 146, 154 (C. C., Ore.
1887) ; Wagner v. Hanna, 38 Cal. 111 (1869). Contra: Goodrich v. Burbank,
12 Allen (Mass.) 459 (1866) ; Penkum v. Eau Claire, 81 Wis. 301, 51 N. W.
550 (1892) ; Percival v. Williams 82 Vt. 531, 74 At]. 321 (1909). See 2
Tiffany, Real Property (2nd ed.), Sec. 350, p. 1226; Washburn, Easements and
Servitudes (4th ed. 1885), p. 11, 45, 257.

THE JOURNAL

OF AIR LAW

purtenant are ordinarily regarded as freely transferable and inheritable.' 6
By referring to servitudes in the zone of "expected use" it would seem that
the court implied that the acquisition of a servitude by aerial navigation in
the lower stratum, although not interfering with the use then being made
of the land, would prevent the owner from later taking permanent occupation of the space in which the servitude had been acquired. This situation
might arise when farm land subsequently becomes valuable for city property.
Judge Hickenlooper, in a concurring opinion, intepreted the distinction
between the upper and lower strata to imply that "although a single flight
over the plaintiffs' land may not contsitute a trespass, such flights may be
so continuous as in the aggregate to do so." He held this "highly technical
question" was unnecessary for the present decision, was not involved in
Portsmouth v. United States, supra, and the result illogical because "if the
aggregate of a large number of flights constitutes a trespass it must be
because each of said flights is itself a trespass." Judge Hickenlooper reads
a great deal into the opinion of Judge Moorman that does not appear from
the bare language used by the latter judge, and if Judge Hickenlooper's
interpretation is correct his criticism would seem technically sound. However, by restricting rights in the upper stratum to an "action for nuisance
and not trespass" Judge Moorman's opinion may possibly be construed
to imply that an action of trespass will lie for a single invasion of the
lower stratum. It is unfortunate, it would seem to the commentator, that
the court did not express his conception of the rights of the landowner in
the airspace in a manner that was not open to so many confusing interpretations. The evils of attempting to lay down rigid rules for the settlement of all future cases is recognized, but ambiguous statements do not
help subsequent judges decide later cases upon their own facts.' 7
After having discussed the landowner's rights in airspace Judge Moorman proceeded to make clear that property rights were:
"unaffected by the regulation promulgated by the Department of Commerce,
16. 2 Tiffanyj, Real Property (2nd ed.), sec. 382, p. 1392.
17. The theory of the extent of private ownership in airspace implied
by the court in its discussion of the rights of the landowner indicates that the
court did not accept the theory advanced by the American Law Institute in
their tentative restatement of the law of torts. The Committee's theory is
that "ownership and possession extend upward indefinitely" but is subject to
a public "easement of transit" at such altitudes as not to unreasonably interfere with the possessor's enjoyment of the surface: Tentative Draft No. 7,
explanatory note appended to section 1002; 1931 U. S. Av. R. 280, 286. By
definitely restricting the rights of the landowner in the upper stratum to an
action of nuisance, the court denied that the owner had the ordinary rights of
ownership "upward indefinitely." Moreover if Judge Hickenlooper's i,,terpretation of the majority of the court's opinion is correct, the landowner does
not have an action of trespass against any single flight no matter at what
height it is made. Surely an "easement of transit" does not imply that flights
can be made without restriction unless an actual servitude upon the use and
enjoyment of the surface is created. An easement of transit does not imply a
right to perform acrobatics or train student pilots above private property
although not amounting to a nuisance. Whether the dicta of the instant court is
consistent with the complete denial ownership of unenclosed airspace recently
advanced by the American Bar Association Committee on Aeronautical Law
is not clear. The Committee would apparently limit the rights of the landowner to an action of nuisance in all cases. The right of the landowner to
prevent the acquisition of servitudes upon his expected use of the surface is
apparently in addition to the right to prevent a nuisance. The omission from
the proposed Uniform Aeronautical Code of the statement of ownership found
in the present Uniform State Law of Aeronautics was recently approved at a
joint meeting of the Aeronautical Law Committee of the American Bar Association and the Aviation Committee of the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws: See page 285 of this issue.
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under the Air Commerce Act of 1926, and adopted by the State of Ohio,
requiring aeronauts to fly in rural sections at a height not less than 500
feet above the surface."
This result is believed sound, as the minimum safe altitude of flight established by the regulations is based on considerations for the safety of the
airplane and would be unconstitutional if interpreted as a taking of property without compensation and without due process of law. In Smith v.
New England Aircraft Co.18 the Federal and Massachusetts regulations
were held to place a limitation upon the landowners' property rights in that
they permitted flying over private property above the minimum safe altitude
of flight, but did not "prevent the plaintiffs from making any actual use
they choose of the airspace above 500 feet in altitude." It was there justified
under the interstate commerce and police power respectively on the ground
that the regulations merely settled the conflicting interests existing between
the landowner and the aviator in the disputed space.
Several observations may be made upon the type of relief needed by the
landowner to adequately protect his interest according to the "necessities of
the period."

(A) Annoyance from a single flight. It is submitted that the

landowner is generally not warranted in seeking court relief from. a single
flight of an airplane through the airspace above his property unless actual
damage results or is imminent. In the Neiswonger case the flight of an airship at an altitude of 200 feet caused plaintiff's team to run away and
physically injured the plaintiff; the court properly granted compensation.1 9
Ordinarily the single flight of an airplane, even that of a large ship at a
very low altitude, is not of sufficient duration or annoyance to cause substantial damage and warrant more than a nominal recovery of damages.
Such suits are economically wasteful and would be of great harm to aviation although their allowance did not lead to closing the airspace above
private land to flying. Exceptions to this assertion must be made for single
flights which are imminently dangerous or made with a malicious intent.
Weather conditions or the conditions of pilot or aircraft may unreasonably
expose the unprotected landowner to the danger of the airplane crashing.
Flights made for the purpose of annoying or of invading the privacy of a
landowner by low flying or aerial photography, would clearly come within
the type of flying which the landowner might reasonably seek to prevent.
Considerations of practical administration possibly indicate that public
prosecutions by state or federal officials may very likely be the best way to
prevent single dangerous flights. Most dangerous flying involves a violation
of the federal licensing regulation for pilots and aircraft or the minimum
safe altitude of flight regulation. The occasional advantage to the landowner is offset by the tremendous handicap to aviation which would follow
from allowing a civil action against a single flight of an airplane. Flights
for commercial exploitation or where spite can be proved probably may be
classified with those flights which cause actual damage.
(B)

Annoyance from recurring flights.

The landowner is primarily

interested in preventing recurring flights over his property that constitute
the ordinary private nuisance, or impair the "value" of his property. Gen18. 270 Mass. 511, 170 N. E. 385 (1930).
19. Neaswonger v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d)

761 (1929).

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
erally a single act will not constitute a nuisance. How many flights will
create a nuisance depends upon many elements-the use to which the land
is put, the size of the plane, the height of flight, and the type of flying at
the time. If easements or servitudes may be acquired by repeated flights
through airspace, the landowner is interested in preventing such flights
when their continuance annoys him or threatens to restrict the future
development of his land. The right of privacy has only occasionally been
recognized but with the increase of flying over country estates will probably
20
Repeated flights by different operators of airbecome more important.
planes may cause a nuisance and yet the flight or flights of no one operator
alone be of sufficient annoyance as to constitute a nuisance. Such a situation would be highly possible in regard to property situated near an airport
from which a great deal of private flying takes place. The action of nuisance would seem inadequate to provide relief against such annoyances and
it is not clear how relief can be provided without allowing an action of
trespass with all the abuses attendant to allowing such an action generally.
With the exception of the incident last mentioned, the action of nuisance
would appear to adequately protect the landowner from the annoyances
created by airplanes flying over his property, especially if the air traffic rules
were reasonably enforced.
It has been thought that the landowner was entitled to an action of
trespass because of the greater ease with which such an action could be
To establish
established. This greater ease is probably over-estimated.
an action for aerial trespass the plaintiff would have to prove that the
flights took place directly above his particular land surface. If an action of
trespass were not allowed against every flight above private property, and
this is usually conceded, then the plaintiff would, in addition, probably have
to prove that the flight came within such a zone as is designated by the
terms "lower stratum," "effective possession," or "actual user." To prove an
invasion of such a zone practically amounts to proving that flying at the
2
altitude of the particular flight complained of may create a nuisance. '
This additional burden will continue until presumptions establish the height
at which airplane flights will amount to a trespass. This height will vary
with the use to which the land is put and the size and nature of the aircraft.
The result is that the burden of proof at the present time on the plaintiff
who brings an action for aerial trespass is greater, at least tinder the prevailing zone theory of the extent of ownership, than if he had brought an
action of nuisance directly. The plaintiff in a nuisance action need not
prove that the airplanes flew directly over his land since airplane flights may
create a nuisance whether directly over property or not. Without doubt
the noise and danger from airplanes in flight are greater directly under the
course of flight but are by no means confined to that area.
20.

MacCheaney, "In Re, Rights of Land Owners with Reference to Opera-

tion of Aircraft" 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 211, 215 (1930) ;Logan, Aircraft Law
-Made Plain (1928), p. 22; Zollmann. Law of the Air (1927), p. 80-1; Hazeltine
The Law of the Air (1911), p. 81-2. On the right of privacy generally, see
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co.. 171 N. Y. 538, 64 N. E. 442 (1902) ;
Hickman v. Maisey, 1 Q. B. 142 (1893) ; Von Thodorovick V. Franz Josef
Beneficial Assn., 154 Fed. 911 (C. C., Pa., 1907); Vassar College v. LooseWiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (D. C., Mo., 1912). See Warren & Brandeis '"The
Right of Privacy," 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890) ; Winfield, "Privacy," 47 Law
Quart. Rev. 23 (1931).
21. See Comment, 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW, 82, 88 (1931).
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The difficulty of proving that a flight took place directly over the
property belonging to the plaintiff is ably illustrated by the testimony introduced in the instant case, as set forth in the briefs of counsel. Three witnesses for the plaintiff "testified to more than fifty specific flights over
plaintiffs' property at elevation from 75 to 400 feet in five days." 2 2 The
pilots of the airplanes making these flights were all employees or students
of the defendants' and testified that they had made the specific flights but
at no time over the property of the Swetlands. 23 The testimony apparently
differed not so much on the elevation at which the flying took place, but
as to whether it took place over plaintiffs' property at all. The court does
not mention this controversy or give any indication as to whose witnesses
it believed. Moreover it is recognized that by going behind the facts stated
in the judge's opinion and judging the case by the facts stressed in the
brief or elsewhere, a situation other than that ruled upon by the judge
4
becomes involved.2
A comparison of the opinions given in Smith v. New England Aircraft
Co., supra, with the two opinions in Swetland v. Curtiss Airport Co., indicates to what extent the three judges differed in their interpretation of the
rights of the landowners. Each court was confronted with a situation
wherein an airport adjoining a country estate was claimed to be a nuisance.
The details of the situations differ and probably account for the differences
in the actual holdings. The language of the three courts however indicates
that they differed in their theoretical conceptions of the landowner's rights
in the airspace which may be discussed under the following headings.
1. Authority of the Maxim "Cuius Est Solum Ejus Usque Ad Coelum" to
Determine Air Rights:
In the Smith case the plaintiffs did not contend that the maxim should
be literally interpreted. The Court, on the other hand, "assumed" that the
landowner did have property rights in the airspace to the extent necessary
for the development of his underlying land.
In the Swetland case the plaintiffs relied upon the maxim, among other
grounds, to establish their rights to exclusive control of the airspace above
their property, but the District Court denied the literal interpretation of the
maxim by refusing to enjoin flying at altitudes greater than 500 feet, and
by asserting that "effective possession" marked the limit of the landowner's
property rights.
In the Swetland case the Circuit Court of Appeals definitely discarded
the maxim as of any force in determining property rights and openly
recognized that rights in airspace must be determined "in relation to the
necessities of the period." The court thereupon distinguished between rights
in the upper and lower strata and recognized that the landowner has the
dominant right of occupancy incident to the development of his land.
2. Effect of the Statutory Establishment of a Minimum Altitude of Flight
Upon Property Rights:
In the Smith case the Massachusetts and Federal definition of "navigable
22.
23.
24.

Appellant's brief, page 23.
Appellant's brief, page 23-4, and appellee's brief, page 12-3.
Frank, "What the Courts Do in Fact," supra, esp. p. 782.
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airspace" and the regulation of 500 feet as a minimum altitude for flying
over rural districts was held to be a limitation upon property rights which
was constitutional because not "in excess of the permissible interference
under the police power and under regulation of interstate commerce with
rights of the plaintiffs in the airspace above that height over their land."
In the Swetland case the District Court states that there is nothing in
either Federal or State "legislation to indicate that either legislative body
* * * considered that there was involved the taking of any property,"
and that the establishment of a minimum safe altitude of flight cannot be
considered a taking of property without due process of law. However it is
uncertain whether the court did not place some reliance upon the minimum
safe altitude of flight from the fact that it indicated that the height of
effective possession and the limit of nuisance from flying would each be
500 feet, the altitude established for the minimum safe altitude of flight over
non-congested districts.
In the Swetland case the Circuit Court of Appeals directly held that the
minimum safe altitude of flight, promulgated under the Air Commerce Act
and adopted by Ohio, did not determine property rights.
3. Flying Over Plaintiffs' Property as Constituting a Trespass:
In the Smith case the court found that flights "at altitudes as low as
100 feet" over the wood borderland of plaintiffs' estate constituted a technical trespass, but did not decide whether the few repeated flights directly
over plaintiffs' dwelling house under 500 feet constituted a trespass, Above
500 feet the court held that flying did not constitute a trespass, presumably
because of the Federal and State acts, supra.
In the Swetland case the District Court enjoined flying over plaintiffs'
property at less than 500 feet on the ground that "such flying, if it would
not constitute trespasses, would at least constitute the maintenance of a
nuisance." The court implied that the landowner had an action of trespass
against aerial invasions in the area of "effective possession," which he asserted in the first instance he would locate at 500 feet. The court nowhere
directly stated that his injunction was based upon trespass.
In the Swet!and case the Circuit Court of Appeals denied the assertion
that every flight of an airplane was a trespass, and stated that defendants'
flying in the instant case did not come within the "lower stratum" wherein
plaintiffs' had peculiar property rights, although it recognized that at times
there must be flying over plaintiffs' property "at a much lower altitude than
500 feet." As earlier discussed, the court does not say whether an action
of trespass could be brought against a single flight of an airplane no matter
how low, but that an action to prevent the imposition of a servitude might
be based presumably on repeated trespasses.
4. Flying Over Plaintiffs' Property as Constituting a Nuisance:
In the Smith case the court apparently did not consider whether flying
itself was a nuisance because the injunction was sought "solely on the ground
of trespass and the nuisance resulting from its continuance." The injunction
was not sought on the ground that the noise and danger incident to flying
amounted to a nuisance in itself, but only to prevent the recurrence of the
trespasses.
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In the Swetland case the District Court held that flying over plaintiffs'
property in taking off and landing at less than 500 feet would constitute
a nuisance "in view of the magnitude of defendants' contemplated operations." In regard to flying over 500 feet the court found that there was
no evidence that such flying constituted a nuisance. Apparently the court
only considered the element of noise as creating the nuisance and did not
expressly consider the danger element.
In the Swetland case the Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that the
flights of airplanes overhead might become a nuisance. The court did not
specifically label any of the flights here involved to be of that character,
although it found that "the plaintiffs will suffer much annoyance from the
noises made by this low flying," i. e., the flying over plaintiffs' property
necessarily involved in taking off and landing when the wind is from the
east or west, which flying would often "be at a much lower altitude than
500 feet."
5.

The General Operation of an Airport as Constituting a Nuisance:

In the Smith case the Master in Chancery found that the "site was
reasonable and proper for a flying field" and that the airport was "properly
maintained and reasonably conducted." In that case woodland separated the
plaintiffs' residence from the airport by 3000 feet. The report of the
Master was accepted by both parties. Apart from flying over plaintiffs'
property the court found that "upon the findings~of the Master there is no
sound ground for injunctive relief on the theory that the acts of the defendants constitute a nuisance."
In the Swetland case the District Court found that the airport was not
a nuisance per se, and that the airport was "suitably located" as judged by
the nature of the surrounding country. Consideration was given to the
noise involved in warming up the airplanes and in taking off and landing
which if found to be a nuisance could not be abated without closing the
airport entirely. Such annoyances were found not sufficient to create a
nuisance. Depreciation in value in plaintiffs' property as a country estate
was dismissed as too problematical and insufficient alone for closing the
airport without other elements amounting to a nuisance. The court considered objections to the lighting system for night operation, an integral
element in defendant's plans, prematurely raised on the ground that the
effect of the system depended on the kind installed.
In the Swetland case the Circuit Court of Appeals enjoined the operation of the airport as a whole. The Court does not speak of the airport as
being a nuisance per se. The court differed from the lower court in concluding that the evidence demonstrated that the noise, danger, crowds,
property depreciation, and night operations, all incident to the airport "as
now located", would be of sufficient annoyance to constitute a nuisance, and
could not be abated without moving the airport.
6.

Manner of Operating Airport as Creating a Nuisance, Other Than Flying
Over Private Property:

In the Smith case the parties accepted the Master's report which found
that the airport was "reasonably conducted," and the court did not discuss
annoyances from the particular manner in which the airport was operated.
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In the Swetland case the District Court analyzed the manner of operating the airport in detail. The dust blown on plaintiffs' land from the airplanes warming up and taking off, and the distributing of circulars from the
air in such a manner as to fall upon plaintiff's land were found abatable
nuisances. Both of these elements could be prohibited without impairing the
general operation of the airport. The manner provided for parking automobiles and the handling of the crowds were found no more annoying
than the crowds attracted by amusement parks which had never been considered to constitute nuisances. The other operations considered by the
District Court were of such a nature that they could not be abated without
closing*the airport.
The Circuit Court of Appeals did not expressly consider the blowing of
dust, the dropping of circulars, the highway congestion, or the crowds.
The defendants did not appeal from the injunction in regard to the blowing
of dust and dropping of circulars. The court placed considerable emphasis
upon the fact that defendants' aviation school, which is not indispensable
to the operation of an airport proper, would greatly increase the noise and
danger because of the number of take-offs and landings that students make
in the process of learning to fly.
EDWARD C. SWEENEY.

COMMENTS
CHATTEL MORTGAGE-

VALIDITY

AS

AFFECTED BY

FAILURE TO REGISTER

TRANsm.- [Illinois) Plaintiff's assignor, the Associated Aircraft, Inc., sold
an airplane, duly registered under the United States Air Commerce Act, to
one Ramsay, who gave a chattel mortgage to the aircraft company to secure
the balance of the payments. This mortgage was duly filed in the recorder's
office of Cook County, Illinois, but the plane was never registered in the
name of Ramsay with the Department of Commerce. Shortly thereafter
Ramsay brought the aircraft to the hangar of the defendant, Blue Bird Air
Service, Inc., who at the time of the trial held a bill of $723.55 for storage
and materials furnished the airplane. The license card, issued by the
Department of Commerce, and exhibited in the plane, showed it to be
licensed in the name of Associated Aircraft, Inc., the mortgagee, and defendant assumed from this evidence that the plane was owned by the aircraft company. The defendant failed to search the records for any prior
mortgages or liens upon the plane. Upon defendant's refusal to deliver the
plane to Ramsay except upon the payment of $723.55, plaintiff brouqht this
action in replevin. The lower court adjudged that the lien of defendant,
Blue Bird Air Service, Inc., was superior to plaintiff's chattel mortgage,
holding that plaintiff could recover the plane only upon paying to defendant
the amount of the latter's lien. Held, on appeal to Illinois Appellate Court,
first district, that plaintiff's chattel mortgage was superior to defendant's
lien. Judgment reversed. Atlas Securities Co. v. Ramsay, 262 Ill. App. 559
(1931).
Defendant in sustaining its claim was confronted with the well settled
rule in Illinois that the lien given to artisans under Cahill's St. 1929, Ch. 82,
paragraphs 45 and 48, is subject to any bona fide chattel mortgage recorded
prior to the commencement of the lien. Ehrlich v. Chapple, 311 Ill. 467,
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143 N. E. 61 (1924). Although a different rule may obtain where the mortgagor acts under the express or implied consent of the mortgagee-Shaw v.
Webb, 131 Tenn. 173, 174 S. W. 273 (1915)-no defense of this kind was
raised in the instant case.
To evade the effect of the above rule, defendant was forced to rely
upon two propositions: (1) The mortgage given plaintiff was not a bona
fide one because the transfer was not registered with the Department of
Commerce in compliance with section 18 of the Air Commerce Regulations;
and (2) The failure of plaintiff's assignor to do its legal duty in registering
the transfer with the Department of Commerce, thus permitting defendant
to assume the mortgagee was the owner, estops plaintiff from asserting the
superiority of its lien.
Section 18 of the Air Commerce Regulations (Aero. Bul. No. 7) of the
Department of Commerce reads in part as follows: "On the date of sale
or transfer of title of licensed aircraft, the recorded owner shall report in
writing to the Aeronautics Branch, Department of Commerce, Washington,
D. C., giving the date and place of sale or transfer and the name and residence of the purchaser."
Thus there was squarely presented to the court the questions whether
compliance with the above regulation was mandatory and whether noncompliance rendered any transfer void and of no effect. Neither the court
nor. this commentator was able to find any reported decisions construing
this section. The court in its decision easily evaded any direct interpretation of the clause, relying on admissions of defendant's counsel to the
effect that: (1) The ownership of the plane was in Ramsay, and (2) The
failure to make registration of the transfer of title to Ramsay did not render
the sale void. The court also relied upon a rather questionable use of burden
of proof, inferring that since it was not disclosed in the evidence that the
recorded owner (plaintiff's assignor) did not report the transfer in compliance with the above section, it must be assumed that it did comply by
making the required report. In view of the stipulated fact that the plane
was not registered in Ramsay's name with the Department of Commerce,
the court's assumption seems somewhat violent. The court, by using the
above reasoning, thus decided this phase of the case without adding any
enlightenment on the interpretation of the quoted section.
In hazarding any opinion as to the effect to be given this section, without the aid of any decision immediately in point, two situations seem sufficiently analogous to bear some comment.
1. Statutes in several of the states regulate sales of second hand automobiles. Some states require the filing of the bill of sale with the Secretary
of State (Colorado, Sec. 7, C.7, L. 1919). In others a transfer of license,
receipt, and bill of sale between vendor and vendee satisfy the requirements
(Texas, Vermon's Ann. Pen. Code Supp. 1922, Arts. 1617yc-1617Yf).
Under these and similar statutes the question of the validity of a transfer
of a second hand automobile without complying with the statute has been
raised in many forms. One group of cases holds that such sales are invalid
for non-compliance: State v. Cox, 306 Mo. 357, 268 S. W. 87 (1924) (invalid
sale does not pass insurable interest) ; Curry v. Iowa Truck and Tractor Co.,
193 Ia. 397, 187 N. W. 36 (1924) (principal whose agent sold without
authority may recover back the car on theory no title passed by failure to
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register the transfer) ; Crandall v. Shay, 61 Cal. A. 56, 214 Pac. 810 (1923)
(attachment on car for debt of vendor before registration of transfer held
to be a superior lien).
The second and larger group of cases holds that sales of second hand
automobiles are valid notwithstanding any failure to comply with the statute:
Hennessey v. Automobile Owners Ins. Assn., 282 S. W. 791 (Tex. 1926) (insurable interest passes by sale notwithstanding non-compliance) ; Littell v.
Brayton, 70 Cal. 286, 201 Pac. 34 (1921) (lien of mortgagee-vendor superior to garage lienor despite failure to register transfer) ; Gaub v. Mosher,
3 N. J. Misc. Rep. 605, 129 Atl. 253 (1925) ; Commercial Credit Co. v.
Schreyer, 120 Oh. St. 568, 166 N. E. 808 (1929) (recorded mortgage on car
held valid as against subsequent mortgagee, though statute as to transfers
had not been complied with at time of execution of first mortgage) ; Carolina Discount Corporation v. Landis Motor Co., 190 N. C. 157, 129 S. E. 414
(1925); Amick v. Exchange State Bank, 164 Minn. 136, 204 N. W. 639
(1925); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Knight, 146 Miss. 862, 111 So. 748 (1927)
(insurable interest transferred).
This apparent conflict is easily explained, however, when it is noted that
the statutes of California, Iowa, and Missouri, involved in the former group
of cases, include an express declaration of invalidity, while the statutes of
the other states are silent upon this point. It is to be noted that Section 18
of the Regulations of the Department of Commerce likewise does not include an express declaration of invalidity.
The courts in interpreting this class of statutes profess to look to the
purpose sought to be accomplished, and rightly hold that the statutes were
passed for the benefit of the state in enforcing taxation and in detecting
automobile thefts. Therefore the state alone can attack transfers which do
not comply with the statute. Applying a similar test to Section 18, it
would seem that the purpose of the regulation is to facilitate inspection of
aircraft, so that planes not airworthy will not be used in interstate commerce. The provisions of Section 20 of the Regulations would seem to bear
out this contention.
It is submitted then that the interpretation applied by the courts to
automobile transfer statutes might well be applied to Section 18, and transfers of airplanes failing to comply with this regulation should nevertheless
be valid, except as against the federal government. Under this interpretation the mortgage in question in the instant case would be a bona fide one
and defendant's lien would be inferior to it.
2. The second situation, to some extent analogous to the Regulation
here in question, is the statute requiring registration upon the sale of a ship.
The Federal statute provides: "Whenever any vessel, which has been registered, is, in whole or in part, transferred to a citizen of the United States,
* * * the vessel shall be registered anew, by her former name, according
to the directions hereinbefore contained, otherwise she shall cease to be
deemed a vessel of the United States * * * ": 46 U. S. C. 39. Under
this statute it has been held that a change of the registry is not necessary
in the sale of a ship to transfer the property in it, the effect of not obtaining a new registry being merely that the ship loses the privilege of an
American bottom: Hatch v. Smith, 5 Mass. 42 (1809).
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In cases involving ships, the facts of which are closely analogous to
those of the instant case, it has been held that a mortgagee-vendor, who
has allowed his name to remain on the registry as owner of the vessel,

cannot be held personally liable for repairs upon the vessel, and this is
true even though the claimant performed the services in actual reliance
upon the credit of the registered owner: Davidson v. Baldwin, 79 Fed. 95
(C. C. A. 6th, 1897) ; Calumet and Hecla Mining Co. v. Equitable Trust Co.,
275 Fed. 552 (S. D., N. Y., 1919). The vendor's allowing his name to remain on the registry is not enough to work an estoppel against him:
The Boise Penrose, 22 F. (2d) 919 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1927). These cases would
seem to be strong authority for holding in the instant case that the plaintiff
could not be held personally liable for the materials furnished the plane,
and thus by inference that the transfer was valid even as against third
persons without registering the transfer as required by Section 18.
In the light of the two analogies discussed above, it would seem that
these conclusions might be drawn as to the interpretation of Section 18 of
the Regulations of the Department of Commerce:
(1) The requirement
of registration of transfers of airplanes is merely an administrative measure
which does not bear any essential relation to the contract of sale entered
into between the parties; (2) The failure to register the plane as provided
for in this section does not void the sale; and (3) A recorded chattel
mortgage on a plane in possession of the mortgagor is valid and superior
to rights of subsequent purchasers or lienors, although the transfer of the
plane to the mortgagor was not registered with the Department of Commerce.
The case of The Boise Penrose, supra, would also seem to be strong
authority against the defendant's contention that the conduct of plaintiff's
assignor in failing to register the transfer estopped it from asserting the
priority of the mortgage. The court, however, disposes of this point by
pointing out that neglect to seek information that is easily accessible precludes a party from claiming the benefit of an estoppel: Vail v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 192 Ill. 567, 61 N. E. 651 (1901).
As the
court points out, if defendant had examined the records in the county
Recorder's office, it could easily have been ascertained whether the plane
was mortgaged. However the records were not checked and defendant must
pay the penalty for negligence.
RICHARD N. HUNTER.
GASOLINE TAX-COMMERCE-STATE SALES TAX ON GASOLINE USED IN
INTERSTATE COMMERCE.-[New Mexico] Plaintiff was an interstate air car-

rier making one stop in the state of New Mexico, where its planes were
refueled. New Mexico statutes imposed an excise tax of five cents per
gallon on all gasoline used or sold within the state: Comp. Stat. N. M.
(1929), secs. 60-101 and 60-203. If the gasoline was purchased within the
state, the tax was levied upon the sale; but if the fuel was purchased outside of the state, the tax was levied upon the use within the state. Plaintiff
brought suit to enjoin the state comptroller from enforcing both sections
of the statute, and obtained the reliefs sought in the trial court. Held, on
appeal, that the tax upon the use, as applied to plaintiff, constitutes a
direct burden upon interstate commerce, and is therefore repugnant to the
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Federal Constitution. The sales tax deals with purely intrastate commerce
and is therefore valid. The trial court correctly enjoined the enforcement
of the use tax, but erred in enjoining the sales tax. Judgment reversed in
part. Transcontinental and Western Air, Inc. v. Lujan, 232 C. C. H. 2016;
U. S. Daily, Dec. 29, 1931 (Sup. Ct., N. M. Decided December 21, 1931).
A rehearing is now pending before the Supreme Court of New Mexico.
There seems to be no question of the invalidity of a tax on the "use"
of fuel by an instrumentality of interstate commerce. That problem was
settled by Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 279 (1928), holding
unconstitutional a tax on gasoline used within the taxing state but purchased
outside the state by a ferry engaged in interstate commerce.
The first few cases involving taxes on fuel consumed in interstate air
transportation, whether upon the use or sale thereof, considered that the
Helson case, supra, was controlling. Oklahoma's statute was thus overthrown: United States Airways v. Shaw, 43 F. (2d) 148 (W. D. Okla.,
1930); comment, 2 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 600 (1931). Enforcement of the
statute involved in the instant case was enjoined on the same principle:
Mid-continent Air Express Corporation v. Lujan, 47 F. (2d) 266 (D. C.,
N. M., 1931); comment 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 132 (1932). To the same
effect as the Mid-continent case is the decree in Transcontinental & Western
Air Lines, Inc. v. Asplund, 232 C. C. H. 1504 (Dist. Ct., 1st Jud. Dist., N. M.,
Dec. 18, 1930). The Wyoming tax was sustained only because its proceeds
were used to maintain municipal airports, and thus the tax constituted a
charge for the use of such airports: Boeing Air Transport Inc. v. Edelman,
51 F. (2d) 130 (D. C., Wyo., 1931) ; this case is now pending appeal before
the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. All
three of the aforementioned Federal District Court cases were heard before
statutory three-judge courts on applications for preliminary injunctions.
The above courts came to error in failing to recognize the distinction
between a tax on the use of gasoline and a tax on the sale thereof. The
Supreme Court of the United States has said, "The difference between an
excise tax based on sales and one based on use of property is obvious and
. ubstantial": Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499, 503, 49 S. Ct. 188
(1929). The statutes in the above cases levied a tax upon the sale of
gasoline as well as upon the use. A tax upon the sale of gasoline was sustained by a statutory three-judge Federal court in South Carolina. The
sale being consummated within the state is a pure intrastate transaction.
What the purchaser intends to do with the gasoline afterwards does not
affect the power of the state to tax. An intrastate sale of an article which
will ultimately entcr into interstate commerce is analogous to the production of an article intended for interstate commerce. Both the intrastate sale
and the production may be taxed by the state of the situs of the goods:
Eastern Air Transport, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 52 F. (2d)
456 (E. D., S. C., 1931). For a tax on the mining of coal intended for
interstate commerce see Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43
S. Ct. 83 (1922). Dismissing the suit for want of jurisdiction on the ground
that the consumer of the gasoline, an interstate trucking company, is in no
position to contest the tax, a statutory court of three judges incidentally
distinguished the sales from the use tax: Central Transfer Co. v. Commercial Oil Co., 45 F. (2d) 400 (E. D., Mo., 1930).
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The Eastern Air Transport case, supra, was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of the United States on March 14, 1932 (as per telegram received
from Charles E. Cropley, clerk of the U. S. Supreme Court). The validity
of state taxation on the sale of gasoline to persons engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce is now authoritatively settled, and the reasoning of
the instant case may be regarded as the sounder.
RAYMOND I. SUEKOFF.
LIFE INSURANCE -INTERPRETATION

OF "PARTICIPATION

IN

AERONAUTIC

OPERATIONs."-[Tennessee] The complainant in the capacity of trustee was
sole beneficiary of three policies of insurance on the life of the deceased,
each of which provided for double indemnity in case of accidental death
except where such death resulted "from participation in aeronautic or submarine operations." The deceased was killed while riding as a free passenger on purely private business in a plane owned by a company of which
he was president. It had been his custom to make use of the company's
planes; when he did so he bought the gasoline and oil and paid the pilot.
Held, the death of the insured resulted from "participation in aeronautic
* * * operations" and double indemnity should be denied the complainant. First National Bank of Chattanooga v. Phoenix Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 232 C. C. H. 2003 (D. C. Tenn., December 15, 1931).
Courts have often and consistently decided that a passenger "participates" but does not "engage" in aviation. (See cases reviewed in a comment upon Gibbs v. Equitable Life Assurance Co., 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
135.) This distinction, though widely adopted, is probably illogical. The
history of it is illuminating. It was presaged in Bezw v. Travelers' Ins. Co.,
95 N. J. L. 533, 122 Atl. 859 (1921), where the phrase for interpretation was
"participating in ...
aeronautics." The following words are found in
that decision: "If it had been intended to confine the application of this
provision to those who pilot or manage the physical operations of such
vessels, it would probably have been expressed by using some such language
as 'engaging in the piloting, management or operation of aeronautical vessels.'" Four years later the Indiana Appellate Court expressly noticed the
fact that there was a wide difference between such a phrase and the words
"engaged in aviation." Thereupon that court decided that a passenger
"engaged" as well as "participated" in aviation: Masonic Accident Ins. Co.
v. Jackson, 147 N. E. 156 (Indiana, 1925).
This decision was appealed to the Indiana Supreme Court and possibly
it would have been affirmed had not the Arkansas Supreme Court on
November 28, 1927, handed down the decision in Benefit Association Railway
Employees v. Hayden, 175 Ark. 565, 299 S. W. 495 (1929), wherein for the
first time it was unequivocably asserted that, while a passenger did participate, yet he definitely did not engage in aviation. The Arkansas decision was based upon an analogy to a line of cases in which it had been
determined that death resulted from "engaging in military or naval service"
only when the insured was "doing something connected with the military
service, in contradistinction to death while in the service due to causes
entirely or wholly unconnected with such service."
Obviously this analogy is imperfect and quite inconclusive, for the cases
cited decided merely that there should be a demonstrable causal relation

THE JOURNAL OF AIR LAW
between the death and the risks peculiar to military service, while a passenger killed in the crash of an airplane is undeniably the victim of a risk
of aviation. Yet the Tennessee decision convinced the Supreme Court of
Indiana that the distinction between the words "participating" and "engaging" was a real and important one, so it reversed the saner decision of the
Appellate Court: Masonic Accident Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 200 Ind. 472, 164
N. E. 628 (1929). In this opinion the faulty logic of the Tennessee Court
was incorporated without alteration. Subsequent decisions in other states
interpreting the word "engaging" have made mere references to the reasoning of the Hayden case: Price v. Prudential Ins. Co., 98 Fla. 1044, 124
So. 817 (1929); Gits v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 F. (2d) 7 (C. C. A. 7th,
1929) ; Flandersv. Benefit Association of Railway Employees, 42 S. W. (2d)
973 (Mo., 1931). Note should be taken that Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
133 Miss. 780, 233 N. Y. S. 500 (1929) was turned not upon this question
but upon the necessary military character of the aviation implied from the
carelessly drafted phrasing of the policy involved
In the instant case the Tennessee Court had the option to declare either
that the additional word "operations" gave this case an anomalous character, or to repeat the touchstone word "participation" and then drop it in
all docility into the settled category. The first course was the more difficult and the court chose not to follow it. Had the phrase been "engaging in
aeronautic operations," as it had been in the Gits case, supra, then that
would have been another matter, but the word "participation" was conclusive in the mind of the court.
And so, largely because the Arkansas Court once strayed after a
capricious analogy, the issues in the present case were determined against
the plaintiff. Certainly, despite the pleasant things that the courts have
endeavored to say about the wisdom of those precedents which made their
opinions easy to write, the elaborate law of these cases is quite indefensible. The insurance policies interpreted were written before there had been
any adjudication of similar policies, and it is ridiculous to argue that the
contracting parties recognized any difference in meaning between the words
"participate" and "engage." In common speech the words are used almost
indiscriminately, and it is an axiom of insurance law that the usages of
common speech are the criteria of interpretation: Houlihan v. Preferred
Ace. Ins. Co., N. Y. 337, 89 N. E. 927 (1909). Under this rule of interpretation all of these cases might be decided either for the plaintiff or the
defendant, but such a distinction as the courts have made is absurdly
artificial. The courts possibly were actuated by a prejudice in favor of the
insured and a recognition that the risks from transport aviation are less
today than when the policies involved in litigation were written.
GEORGE BALL.
NEGLIGENCE-COMMON

KNOWLEDGE-AIR

BATIC FLYING AT Low ALTITUDE-[ Texas]

TRAFFIC

REGULATIONs-AcRO-

The defendant, owner and oper-

ator of an airplane, for compensation took plaintiff's minor son, age 16,
and another boy for two short sight-seeing or pleasure trips over their home
town. During the course of the second ride the defendant "looped the loop"
at a low altitude over houses, buildings and haystacks; while attempting a
second loop the tail of the machine struck a stack of corn and the plane
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crashed to the ground, resulting in the death of plaintiff's son. The defendant testified that in making a loop he lost altitude of about 300 feet.
The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and found specifically that the
defendant began the fatal loop at an altitude of between 200 and 400 feet
and that such action constituted negligence. Held, on appeal, that there
was ample evidence from which the jury could find negligence. Judgment
affirmed. English v. Miller, 43 S. W. (2d) 642 (Tex. Ct. of Civ. App., 1931).
The principal issue submitted to the jury was whether defendant was
negligent in attempting acrobatic flying at such a low altitude. No evidence was offered of any mechanical defects in the plane and it was admitted that defendant was a trained and experienced pilot. The defense
of assumed risk set up by the defendant in his pleadings seemed to play
no important part in the case and is not discussed on review. Since, apparently, no experts were called to testify as to what constitutes negligent
acrobatic flying the appeals court considers as its chief problem whether
the jury could properly find negligence from the circumstantial facts that
defendant attempted to "loop the loop" at an altitude of not over 400 feet
and that he lost altitude of at least 300 feet on each successful attempt.
Other questions raised by the decision are the pertinency of the Federal
Air Traffic Rules and the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Relying upon the general principle that "negligence may be established
by circumstantial evidence, and the cause of an action may be inferred from
such evidence," the court invokes in support of its holding that the evidence justified a finding of negligence, the so-called theory of "common
knowledge." This theory, a part of the general doctrine of judicial notice,
means simply that as to those facts and principles, which are of such 'universal knowledge that they may be regarded as part of the common knowledge of all persons, no evidence need be offered: Wigmore, Evidence
(2nd Ed. 1923), secs. 2565, ff; Jones, Commentaries on Evidence (2nd Ed.
1926), sec. 424. Like the general doctrine of judicial notice, this theory is
thought of as applying primarily to the tribunal itself, i. e., the judge. But
by analogy it is applicable to the jury as well: Wigmore, supra, sec. 2569;
Jones, supra, sec. 471. "Jurors should take with them their knowledge and
experience of affairs, and are not only at liberty to use the same in drawing conclusions from the evidence, but ought to make use of such knowledge": Barker, J., in McGarrahan v. N. Y. & H. R. Co., 171 Mass. 211,
50 N. E. 61 (1898).
The theory of common knowledge has been consistently used with
reference to the operation and effect of natural forces and such mechanical
and scientific facts as are supposedly the universal knowledge of all: Chiulla
de Luca v. Park Commrs., 94 Conn. 7, 107 Atl. 611 (1919) (noticed judicially
that a tall tree is a place of greater danger in a thunder storm) ; Board of
Education v. Ind. Comm., 301 Ill. 611, 134 N. E. 70 (1922) (notice taken
of the dangerous nature of a buzz saw); People v. Linde, 341 Ill. 269, 173
N. E. 361 (1930) (noticed that heavy trucks cause damage to highways).
The doctrine has been applied to various well known facts concerning various modern improvements and inventions: L. & N. Ry. Co. v. Geoghagen,
203 Ky. 198, 261 S. W. 1104 (1924) (railroads) ; Theisen v. Detroit Taxicab
& Transfer Co., 200 Mich. 136, 166 N. W. 901 (1918) (telephones);
Penisular Tel. Co. v. McCaskill, 64 Fla. 420, 60 So. 338 (1912) (electrical
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appliances and equipment) ; Westfalls Storage, Van & Express Co. v. City
of Chicago, 280 Ill. 318, 117 N. E. 439 (1917)
(automobiles) ; Gust v.
Muskegon Co-op. Oil Co., 226 Mich. 532, 198 N. W. 175 (1924) (gasoline).
As long ago as 1914 a New York court stated: "Although airplanes are
of comparatively recent invention, yet we think their use has become so
general that the term "airplane" may now be taken to have a specific
meaning and to describe a general type of machine": Platt v. Erie County
Agricultural Society, 164 App. Div. 99, 149 N. Y. S. 520 (1914) (judicial
notice was taken of the chief mechanical features of aircraft and the
methods of their operation). In 1930 a Massachusetts court took judicial
notice of "facts of common knowledge" concerning navigation of the air:
Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 571, 170 N. E. 385 (1930)
(noticed that aviation is an important modern problem, that it is impossible
to confine the flight of aircraft to the space over existing ways, etc.). These
authorities indicate that well known features of aircraft operation may
rightly be included within the scope of the doctrine of common knowledge.
In the instant case the problem reduces itself to this: Does the average
juryman know enough about the operation of airplanes to say that an
attempt to "loop the loop" at an altitude of less than 400 feet over buildings
and haystacks, coupled with the fact that each loop results in an altitude
loss of 300 feet, constitutes negligence? It is not difficult to agree with the
court that the experience of the average man of today has been wide enough
to justify him in finding negligence from these facts. One hundred feet, or
less, is obviously a small margin of safety for such acrobatics.
In many airplane accident cases involving injury or loss of life wide
use has been made of expert testimony: Hagymasi v. Colonial Western
Airways, 1931 U. S. Av. R. 73 (Superior Ct. N. J., 1931) (experts testified as to overloading of the plane, condition of the engine, etc.) ; Allison
v. Standard Air Lines, Inc., 1930 U. S. Av. R. 292 (U. S. D. C., S. D., Calif.,
1930) (experts testified as to weather conditions, etc.). It will be seen that
these cases involved scientific and mechanical facts upon which the testimony of experts could shed much light. It is doubtful if the theory of
common knowledge would be applicable to them, for the intricate principles
of aerial navigation and meteorology are not the knowledge of the average
man. In the instant case experts could no doubt have been asked their
opinions as to safe altitudes for acrobatic flying; but the sole question being
whether defendant was negligent in stunting at such a low altitude, it is
improbable that experts could have added greatly to the jury's ability to
solve the problem.
From the facts as found by the jury the defendant was violating at least
two rules of the Air Traffic Rules formulated by the Department of Commerce under authority of a provision in the Air Commerce Act of 1926
(49 U. S. C. 173 e) : (1) He was performing acrobatic stunts (semble)
over a congested area of a city, town or settlement in violation of section
72 (2) (a) ; (2) He was acrobatically flying an airplane while carrying
passengers for hire in violation of section 72 (2) (d) : Air Traffic Rules,
Aero. Bul. No. 7 (1932), ch. 7. The only reference by the court to these
provisions is in the following statement: "The Air Commerce Regulations
of the United States inhibit acrobatic flying in an airplane by any person
carrying passengers for hire, but such regulations were not pleaded, and,
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had they been, appellant was evidently engaged in intrastate flying, and the
Legislature of this state did not adopt the rules and regulations of the
federal government until some time after January 26, 1928" (the date of
the accident).
Contrary to the implications of the above statement, the federal Air
Traffic Rules purport to apply to all flights, both intrastate and interstate
(Sec. 67, Air Traffic Rules), and Texas has only adopted the licensing
provisions of the federal regulations: Laws 1929, Ch. 285. The constitutionality of the Air Traffic Rules in general has been upheld on the ground
that the federal government has wide police powers with reference to
interstate commerce: Smith v. New England Aircraft Co., 270 Mass. 571,
170 N. E. 385 (1930).
As applied to flights wholly intrastate the altitude
rules have been supported upon the "burden theory"' of interstate commerce:
Swetland v. Curtiss Airports, 41 F. (2d) 929 (N. D., Ohio, 1930). Analogies
are drawn to the cases involving railroads, water navigation, and telegraph
companies in which it has been held that Congress may regulate intrastate
commerce in these fields if necessary to preserve the freedom, well-being,
or safety of interstate commerce: see Logan, "The Interstate Commerce
'Burden Theory' Applied to Air Transportation," 1 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW

433 (1930); Note, 1
AIR LAW 122 (1932).
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But a lower federal court decision, though apparently supporting the
burden theory, has expressed doubts concerning the validity of the altitude
regulations when applied to a flight wholly intrastate:
Neiswonger v.
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 35 F. (2d) 761 (N. D., Ohio, 1929). The
court said: "It is a little difficult to see in what respect interstate aircraft
navigating at or above the prescribed elevation can be endangered or interfered with by intrastate craft moving in a lower plane. However dangerous
this may be to the intrastate craft and to persons and property on the
ground, the danger to interstate flight is not apparent." See also Hotchkiss,
Aviation Law (1928), sec. 57.
The words of the above decision apply with even greater force to the
stunting regulations involved in the instant case. It may be highly desirable
that acrobatic flying with passengers be prohibited and that no stunting be
performed over congested areas; but it is doubtful if either of these regulations is necessary for the protection of the freedom, safety, or well-being
of interstate commerce. They seem designed to protect the public at large
rather than interstate air traffic. Furthermore, in the instant case, defendant's flight was for a few miles over a small town far in the interior
of Texas where there may have beer, no interstate air traffic within many
miles.
The court declared that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would be
applicable under the facts revealed by the record but for the fact that
plaintiff alleged specific acts of negligence, for which reason the doctrine
could not be invoked. The court follows the settled Texas rule that allegation of specific acts of negligence bars the plaintiff from relying upon
the presumption of res ipsa loquitur: Johnson v. Galveston R. Co., 66 S. W.
906 (Tex. Civ. App., 1902); Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Helms, 261 S. W.
225 (Tex. Civ. App., 1924). The same rule is followed in other jurisdictions: Roscoe v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., 202 Mo. 576, 101 S. W. 32 (1907);
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White v. Chicago & G. W. Ry. Co., 246 Fed. 427 (C. C. A. 8th, 1917).
But in many other jurisdictions this rule is rejected; even though the plaintiff alleges specific acts of negligence he may still rely upon the presumption: Stewart v. Barre, 94 Vt. 39, 111 Atd. 526; First v. Capitol Park Realty
Co., 98 Conn. 627, 120 Atl. 300, 29 A. L. R. 17 (1923). On the general
subject see Niles, "Pleading Res Ipsa Loquitur," 7 N. Y. L. Quart. Rev.
415 (1929).
The courts adopting the strict rule followed by the Texas decisions reason that the rule of res ipsa loquitur is indulged because the plaintiff, not
being familiar with the instrumentalities used, has no knowledge of the
specific acts concerning the injury; but if plaintiff by his petition shows
that he is sufficiently advised concerning the exact negligent acts causing
the injury as to plead them specifically, then the reason for the presumption
has vanished: Roscoe v. Metropolitan St. Ry. Co., supra. As a matter
of logical symmetry in pleading this reasoning can no doubt find support:
see Niles, supra, 423-25. But there is ground for saying that the strict
rule works undue hardship on the plaintiff in an airplane accident case. He
must elect whether to rely upon specific allegations or the presumption of
res ipsa loquitur. He may be reluctant to rely upon the presumption, for
the law with regard to airplane accidents is as yet so nebulous that it can
hardly be predicted whether a court will allow the use of the doctrine: see
Curtiss Flying Service, Inc., v. Seaman, 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251
(1930) (res ipsa loquitur held applicable) ; Wilson v. Colonial Air Transport Co., 1931 U. S. Av. R. 109 (Municipal Ct., Boston, 1931) (doctrine
rejected) ; Osterhout, "The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to
Aviation," 2 Air L. Rev. 9 (1931). In the present formative state of the
law it would seem better to permit plaintiff to make all the proof he can
in regard to the cause of the accident, and then, if his best attempt has
failed, to give him the benefit of res ipsa loquitur.
JOHN T. MATTHEWS.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PRIVATE

PILOT AS AN EMPLOYEE.-[Illinois]

The defendant employer was a merchandise manager for Mandel Bros., in
Chicago. He owned an airplane which he used for both business and pleasure
trips. The plaintiff's husband was a pilot. By an agreement between the
defendant and the pilot the pilot, when not otherwise engaged, was to pilot
the defendant's plane upon the request of the defendant or the defendant's
brother-in-law.

For his services the pilot was to be paid $10. per hour of

actual flying time, and if the flight lasted more than an hour he was to be
guaranteed at least $25. per day. He was to be, and had in the past been
paid by the defendant. Prior to the accident the defendant had filed with
the Industrial Commission a written acceptance and election to be bound by

the Compensation Act, according to the provisions of the Statute, and had
also taken out Workmen's Compensation insurance to cover this pilot. On
September 14, 1929, the defendant's brother-in-law requested the pilot to
fly the plane on a pleasure trip, and the pilot did so. Upon returning to the
airport the plane collided with another plane and the pilot was killed. His
widow sued the defendant for Compensation under the Compensation Act.

Held, on appeal, that the claimant's husband was an employee of the defendant within the terms of the act and the widow is entitled to compensa-
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tion. Judgment reversed. Meyer v. Industrial Commission, 347 Ill. 173, 179
N. E. 456 (1931).
Although there are several points involved in the instant case they may
all be resolved into the single question: Was this pilot an "employee" of
the defendant within the terms of the Workmen's Compensation Act?
By Section 1 of the Compensation Act it is provided that any employer
in this state, not already under the act by reason of his business being extrahazardous, may elect to come under the Act by filing a certificate of election
with the Industrial Commission, or by taking out Workmen's Compensation
insurance. Also, it is provided that in the event an employer does elect to
come under the act his employees are deemed to have accepted its terms
too, unless they renounce within a limited period: Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1931) Ch. 48, Sec. 201. This provision of the Statute was the same in 1929
when the accident occurred. Section 5 of the Act in 1929 provided: "The
term 'employee', as used in this Act shall be construed to mean: * * *
Second: Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire,
express or implied, oral or written,-but not including any totally blind
person or any person who is not engaged in the usual course of the trade,
business, profession, or occupation of his employer; * * *": Cahill's Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1929) Ch. 48, sec. 205.
The instant case is one of first impression in some respects and is an
important precedent. Analagous cases of private chauffeurs for automobiles
have not been found. The principal question is, as indicated, as to the
status of this pilot.
Under the law in force in 1929 when the death occurred the term
"employee" included then only those persons "under a contract of hire to
another", and who were engaged in "the usual course of the trade, business,
profession, or occupation of the employer". That this statutory definition of
employee means just what it says has been previously decided. It has been
held that unless these two primary requisites are present, namely: (1) a
contract of hire; and (2) an engagement in the usual course of the employer's trade or occupation, the party claiming compensation is not an
employee and does not come within the Act: Johnson Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 306 Ill. 197, 137 N. E. 789 (1922) ; Uphoff v. Industrial Board,
271 Ill. 312, 111 N. E. 128 (1916); H. Roy Berry Co. v. Industrial Commission, 318 Ill. 312, 149 N. E. 278 (1925) ; Kelly v. Industrial Commission,
326 Ill. 320, 157 N. E. 209 (1927); Angerstein, The Employer and the
Workmen's Compensation Act of Illinois (1923) p. 182.
That much being settled, the principal question in the instant case,
leaving aside for the moment the matter whether this pilot was or was not
an independent contractor, should have been: Was this pilot in the service
of the defendant under a contract of hire, and engaged in the usual course
of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the defendant? On the
first point, the opinion does not consider apparently to any great extent the
matter of whether or not there was any contract of hire between the defendant and the pilot, although one looks in vain for any obligation incurred
by the pilot in the arrangement. But aside from this possible objection to
recovery, an even greater one can be suggested on the second point-as to
whether or not the pilot was engaged in the usual course of the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the defendant.
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As to this the reasoning of the court is rather unsatisfactory. After
reviewing the definition of "employee", as given above, and the provisions
of the act permitting the employer to insure his liability, the opinion states:
"It is evident that by filing the above mentioned certificate and taking out
compensation insurance, Louer (the employer) elected to put himself under
the act and fully complied with all the requirements of the Act to that
end. * * * Thus Meyer (the pilot), by Louer's election and his failure
to renounce under the Act, became an employee and subject to the terms of
the Act unless he was, as counsel contend, an independent contractor:"
p. 458, 179 N. E. Nothing at all is said as to the very crux of the case, in
answer to the argument that a private pilot flying a plane for its owner,
who is engaged in the merchandise business, partly for business, but largely
for pleasure trips, is not engaged in the usual course of his employer's
business, and hence not within the Compensation Act, and more emphatically
is this true when at the time the accident occurred the pilot was flying the
plane not for the owner but for the owner's brother-in-law on what was
admitted to have been a pleasure trip.
Although it is true, as the Court says, that the employer by electing to
come under the Act and by taking out insurance, thus became bound by
the Act, he did not, as the Court would seem to indicate, become bound to
any and all persons who might work for him. He became bound to pay
compensation only to such persons as came within the definition of "employee" as defined by the Act and not to such persons as were not under a
contract of hire, or were not engaged in the usual course of his trade,
business, profession, or occupation: Johnson Co. v. Industrial Commission,
supra; Uphoff v. Industrial Board, supra; H. Roy Berry Co. v. Industrial
Commission, supra; Kelly v. Industrial Commission, supra. The plain words
of the Statute admit of no other interpretation. As to the further statement
in the opinion, that, by the employer's election to be bound by the Act and
the pilot's failure to renounce the Act, thus automatically the pilot became
an employee, regardless of whether engaged in the usual course of the defendant's business or not, it need only be said that such view would seem
to be clearly contrary to the expressed intention of the Legislature and if
followed to its logical conclusion amounts to judicial nullification of Section
5, subsection 2 of the Compensation Act.
Section 1 of the Act, providing for election by an employer, and Section
5, defining what an employee is, should be read together. The Compensation
Act was enacted as a whole and it was never meant that one section should
be taken as totally disassociated from the other sections: Uphaff v. Industrial
Board, supra. Does the instant opinion mean that these two sections are
separable? Does it mean that, by the mere election of an employer to
come under the Act and the mere failure of his workman to renounce,
such workman automatically becomes an employee, irrespective of whether
the workman is engaged in the employer's regular business? Does the
Court mean to separate Section 1 and Section 5? If so, the interpretation
is strained and erroneous and the case was wrongly decided for that reason.
If not, if these two sections are still to be read together as they should be,
then the case was still wrongly decided because it cannot be fairly said
that this pilot, in this particular situation was engaged in the usual course
of the defendant's business as Manager for Mandel Brothers.
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But there is another possible explanation of the principal case. At the
last regular session of the Legislature (1931), Section 5, Subsection 2, of the
Workmen's Compensation Act was amended in a most material aspect. After
the definition of "employee" as given above, stating that the word does
not include persons not engaged in the usual course of the employer's
trade, business, profession, or occupation, the 1931 Amendment is as follows:
"Provided, however, that any employer may elect to provide and pay compensation to any employee other than those engaged in the usual course of
the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the said employer by
complying with Section 1 of this Act:" Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat. (1931),
Chap. 48, See. 205. The mere fact that the Legislature saw fit to enact this
amendment indicates rather clearly the Legislative intention and construction of the law prior to this time, namely, that the Compensation Act
did not include persons who were not engaged in the usual course of their
employer's business.
The Supreme Court has not yet interpreted this Amendment. As outlined above, according to the law presumably in force in 1929, the time of
the accident in the instant case, it is at least questionable whether the case
was rightly decided, because of the fact that a strong argument could be
made that this pilot was not engaged in the usual course of the defendant's
business and was not therefore an employee under the Act. But, according
to the 1931 Amendment, the employer may, if he chooses, provide compensation for workmen even though not engaged in the usual course of his
business. Although the position of the Court is somewhat ambiguous, it is
possible that it, may have been considered that this Amendment had retroactive effect, and thus controlled a situation occurring more than two years
before the Amendment went into effect. If such is the position taken, a
very serious question might arise as to whether this was not a violation
of due process: Rankel v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 109 Ch. St. 152,
141 N. E. 835 (1923). If, on the other hand, the Court did not mean to
take this extereme position, then the law should apply as it was in 1929,
and under that view the position of the Court is unsound for the reasons
above given.
Although this was the principal point in the instant case there is another
matter that should be noticed. The question was raised as to whether or
not the pilot in this case was at the time of the accident a special employee
of the defendant's brother-in-law. In deciding that the pilot was not such
an employee, the Court disposes of the matter in these words: "As we have
seen, Bird (the brother-in-law) had no authority to discharge Meyer (the
pilot). * * * This court has held that an unfailing test in determining
the relation of master and servant is whether the control of the servant
includes the power to discharge him, and unless that power exists the
relation of master and servant does not exist:" P. 458, 179 N. E.
At common law, prior to the enactment of the Workmen's Compensation legislation, it is true that a general employer might for temporary
purposes loan his employee to another party and the employee would, during
the existence of such relation, be regarded as the employee not of the general
employer but of the special employer to whom he had been lent: Grace
and Hyde Co. v. Probst, 208 Ill. 147, 70 N. E. 12 (1904); Consolidated
Fireworks Co. v. Koehi, 190 Ill. 145, 60 N. E. 87 (1901) ; Scribner's case,
231 Mass. 132, 120 N. E. 350 (1918) ; Cayll v. Industrial Commission, 172
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Wis. 554, 179 N. W. 771 (1920). See also, for the English change in this
Matter: Stat. 6, Edw. VII, Ch. 58, Sec. 13.
The question now is whether this distinction between general employers
and special employers is any longer valid under the Workmen's Compensation Legislation. The authorities it must be admitted are in conflict. The
difficulty is that, at least in Acts similar to the Illinois Act, the term
"employee" has been defined as "anyone under any contract of hire, express
or implied with another:" Cahill's Ill. Rev. Stat., supra. Authorities taking
the view that the common, law has been changed say that under the clear
words of the Compensation Acts if there is a contract between a so-called
employee and his employer it is immaterial that there may also have been
a second special employer. The general employer is in any event liable
for compensation because of his contract. The contract is the thing to be
looked to now. It is not the province of the court to engraft common law
distinctions upon a word which has been defined once and for all by the
Legislature. Other authorities have adopted the view that despite what
the Legislature may have said about an employee, the common law rules are
still applicable and the general employer is not liable for "compensation in
such cases: Scribner case, supra: Cayll v. Industrial Commission, supra;
Puhlman v. Excelsior Express and Standard Cab Co., 259 Penn. 393, 103
Atl. 218 (1918); Knudson v. Jackson, 191 Ia. 947, 183 N. W. 391 (1921);
Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Ia. 498, 168 N. W. 916 (1918); Rongo v.
Waddington and Sons, 87 N. J. L. 395, 94 Atl. 408 (1915); Harper, Workmen's Compensation, p. 209; Angerstein, The Employer and the Workmen's
Compensation Act of Illinois p. 168-195.
The view that the common law distinction has been abolished, and that
the primary consideration on this question should now be whether there
is a contract of hire or not would seem to be more acceptable, in view
of the fact that the Compensation Act has changed the common la'v in so
many respects, and in view of the fact that the Act does specifically define
an, employee as one under a "contract of hire." Had this view been taken
in the instant case the whole question of whether or not the pilot was a
special employee of the owner's brother-in-law could very easily have been
dismissed by merely saying one of two things: (1) that there was no
evidence of any contract between the brother-in-law and the pilot; or (2)
that it is immaterial whether the re was or was not a contract of that
character, because, in any event, if there was a contract between the pilot
and the defendant in this case and if the pilot had been engaged -inthe
usual course of the defendant's business, the defendant would have been
liable under the Act.
CHAS. G. BRIGGLE, JR.

DIGESTS
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNsPIRACY TO VIOLATE AIR TRAFFIC RuLEs.-[Federal]
The defendants were indicted for conspiracy to do an act in violation of
"the Air Traffic Law and Rules of the United States," to-wit, the Air

Commerce Act-authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to establish air
traffic rules and making unlawful the violation of such rules-and the rules
and regulations established in conformity thereto. The rules that the defendants were charged with conspiracy to violate were Sec. 1, Sub-Sec. F,
providing, "When an aircraft is in flight the pilot shall not drop or release
*

*

*

any object or thing which may endanger life or injure property,
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except when necessary to the personal safety of the pilot, passengers, or
crew * * *," and Sub-Sec. K, prohibiting the transportation of explosives. The indictment charged the defendants with transporting by
airplane bombs and explosives from Illinois to Kentucky, and with dropping
them "in Webster County, Kentucky, to the great danger of life and injury
of property." Five of the defendants pleaded guilty and were sentenced
to imprisonment in the Atlanta penitentiary, two for a year and a day, and
three for eighteen months. United States v. Montgomery, et al., 1931 U. S.
Av. R. 29 (D. C., W. D. Ky., 1930).
This seems to be the first reported prosecution for violation of the
federal air traffic rules.
ABRAHAM FISHMAN
INSURANCE-AccIDENT WHILE ALIGHTING FROM AN AIRPLANE AS WITHIN
ExCEPTION FOR ACCIDENTS "WHILE IN OR ON AN AIRPLANE".-[Louisiana]

The plaintiff's husband held an accident policy in the defendant company
for the benefit of the plaintiff. A clause in the policy provided that the
insurance did not cover injuries to the insured sustained "while in or on
any vehicle or mechanical device for aerial navigation, or in falling therefrom or therewith." The insured and some friends chartered a sea-plane
for a pleasure flight across Lake Pontchartrain. In getting aboard the
plane for the return trip the insured stepped upon the wing, was struck
by the propellor and killed. The lower court sustained an "exception
of no cause of action" to the plaintiff's petition, and the plaintiff appealed.
Held, the insured did meet his death "while in or on" a "vehicle or
mechanical device for aerial navigation." Judgment affirmed. Murphy v.
Union Indemnity Co. 172 La. 383, 134 So. 256 (1931).
Apparently only two other courts have considered questions arising from
fact situations similar to this. In the case of Pittman v. Lamar Life Insurance Co., 17 F. (2d) 370 (C. C. A., 5th, 1927) the significant language of
the exclusion clause was "while participating or as a result of participation
in any submarine or aeronautic expedition or activity, either as passenger
or otherwise." In that case the insured had disembarked and walked to
the front of the plane when he stepped too close to the propeller. It was
decided that the term "aeronautic activity" was broad enough to cover
getting out of an airplane. A year later the phrase for the interpretation
of a California court was "while participating or in consequence of having
participated in aeronautics". In this case the insured was killed by the
propellor of a plane in which he had just been riding. The court, failing
to find a causal relation between the airplane rule and the accident to the
deceased, held against the insurance company: Tierney v. Occidental Life
Ins. Co. 89 Cal. App. 779, 265 Pac. 400 (1928).
It is not possible to draw a valid generalization from these cases since
the language of the policies in question differs in each case.

GEORGE BALL
INSURANCE-INCONTESTABLE

CLAUSE-DEATH WHILE ENGAGED IN AERIAL

NAVIGATION.-[Louisiana] This was an action on an insurance policy which
contained a provision that in case of the death of the insured from engaging
in aerial navigation, "except while riding as a fare-paying passenger in a
licensed commercial air craft provided by an incorporated common carrier
for passenger service and while such air craft is operated by a licensed
transport pilot and is flying in a regular civil airway between definitely
established airports, the only liability under this policy shall be for a sum
equal to the premiums paid thereon, and the policy shall thereupon be
The insured was killed while a passenger in an airplane
terminated."
which met none of these requirements. However, the beneficiary sued for
the full face value of the policy contending that a clause which stipulated
that the policy should "be incontestable after it shall have been in force,
during the lifetime of the insured, for one year from the date of the
Policy, except for non-payment of premium or for violation of the conditions
of the Policy relating to military or naval service in time of war," was
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determinative of this case. The Court of Appeals decided this action for

the plaintiff beneficiary. Held, on appeal, that the incontestable clause
negatived the effect of the exception for airplane travel. Judgment affirmed.
Bernier v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 232 C. C. H. 2015 (Louisiana

Sup. Ct. Decided January 4, 1932).
The decision of this case by the Court of Appeals is reported under
the title of Leidenger v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 135 So. 85
(1931). Essentially the same questions were raised by the arguments before
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court and they are adequately discussed in a comment on Leidenger v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. in 2
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 602 (1931).
GEORGE BALL
NEGLIGENCE-

CONTRIBUTORY

NEGLIGENCE -

QUALIFICATIONS

OF

PILOT.-

[California] Plaintiff was receiving instruction in flying under a contract
with defendant company by which the company agreed, for a consideration
(the amount being dependent on whether the plaintiff's or defendant's
plane was used) to provide a "competent instructor" in "practical flying at
the port or flying field of the company." On the day of the accident,
plaintiff's own craft, which was unlicensed although it had been assigned
an identification number, was being used, and the defendant had furnished
as art instructor a pilot who held only a limited commercial license (permitting flight only within ten miles of the base port). At plaintiff's request,
he and the instructor flew to Ponomo, California, over ten miles from defendant's base port, plaintiff operating the plane during the greater part
of the journey, but the instructor operating it at the time of the accident.
While flying at an altitude of about 300 feet, the plane crashed and plaintiff
and his plane were injured. There was conflicting evidence as to whether
the instructor's operation (apart from low altitude) was negligent. The
trialcourt found (in addition to findings not complained of) : (1) "That it
is untrue that . . . defendants appointed . . . an unlicensed pilot as
defendant's servant and employee to act as instructor to said plaintiff
(2) That the instructor was not negligent; and (3) That the
.";
plaintiff was contributorily negligent, in that, being unlicensed, he had
flown the plane to Ponoma. Held, on appeal, that the judgment should be
affirmed since: (1) there was some evidence to support each finding (and
in particular to support the finding that the instructor was not negligent);
and (2) plaintiff could not complain of the use of his own unlicensed craft
nor of the violation of the instructor's license limitations, since both were
at his express request. Pickering v. California Airways, 67 Cal. App. Dec.
442, 4 P. (2d) 271 (1931).
The decision herein can not be questioned, since it is well settled that
a finding of fact by a trial court, based on conflicting testimony will not be
disturbedon appeal. The only finding which could have been questioned
under this doctrine was that relating to the pilot's license. In making such a
finding the trial court undoubtedly fell into error, as the question was not
whether the pilot held some license, but whether he held a license covering
the flying operation in which he was engaged. It is submitted that, as to
this flight, the pilot was "unlicensed." However, this finding is not necessary
to the judgment, both because of the finding of lack of negligence and
because the lack of license was waived by plaintiff in proposing the flight
with knowledge of the pilot's actual license.
ROBERT

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-SCOPE

ING FROM PROHIBITED ACROBATIC

OF

KINGSLEY.

EMPLOYMENT-INJURY

FLYING.-[Wisconsin]

RESULT-

The deceased was

employed by the plaintiff air transport company as a pilot and general
manager of its flying field. One of his duties was to take passengers for
rides. In the course of such a flight he made a sharp power dive and was
killed. On an appeal from an award the plaintiff contended that the death
did not occur in the course of the employment for three reasons: (1)
That no tickets were sold or money paid for the ride; (2) That the deceased
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had been drinking intoxicating liquor just prior to the flight; and (3)
That by taking the power dive he stepped out of the course of his employment. The Wisconsin statute required that aircraft operations comply with
the federal air traffic rules, one of which prohibited pilots carrying passengers
for hire from engaging in acrobatic flying, defined to mean "intentional
maneuvers not necessary to air traffic." Held, (1) The failure to require
tickets was only a minor infraction of the prescribed routine, which, in
the case of a general manager, necessarily empowered with a wide discretion,
could not have the effect of taking him out of the course of employment;
(2) Nor was tJke drinking of the intoxicating liquor sufficient to remove
the deceased from the course of his employment, there being no evidence
as to how much he drank nor that he was intoxicated or affected by it; (3)
But by taking the dive, which may reasonably be assumed to be in violation
of his orders, the deceased left the course of his employment, for, in the
first place, the act, besides being unlawful, wos an act "unnecessary in
the performance of his duty" and was one which in no "manner did or
could possibly have furthered the interests of his employer," and secondly,
the act was done deliberately "for the sole and only purpose of gratifying
his own pleasure of having a thrill." Award set aside. Sheboygan Airways,
Inc., et al. v. Field & ano., 232 C. C. H. 2027, March 3, 1932 (Circ. Ct.,
Dane County, Wisc., Feb. 15, 1932).
The air traffic rule referred to applies only to carriage for hire. The
plaintiff apparently contended that this was not a flight for hire, but the
opinion does not consider whether this was such a flight so as to be
within the regulation. For analagous cases see Datin v. Vale, 1931 U. S.
Av. R. 175 (Pa. Dept. of Labor and Industry, Jan. 19, 1931), 3 JOURNAL
OF AIR LAW 143, and Constitution Indemnity Co. v. Shytles et al., 47 F. (2d)
441 (C. C. A., 5th, 1931), 3 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW 137.
ABRAHAM FISHMAN

